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American Citizenship After Afroyim and
Bellei: Continuing Controversy
By DAviD F. SCHWARTZ*
One of the least heralded of the important constitutional decisions
made during the sixties was the Warren Court's attempt to define the
elusive concept of American citizenship. On the surface, the decision in
Afroyim v. Rusk' seemed to resolve a century of doubts concerning the
extent of congressional power to withdraw an individual's citizenship.
This resolution was, however, largely illusory. Indeed, it is surprising
how little relevance Afroyim had regarding the most pressing questions
about the durability of citizenship. In Rogers v. Bellei,2 the Court not
only failed to come to grips with these remaining problems, but it also
obscured what seemed to be Afroyim's clear holding: absent the citi-
zen's voluntary renunciation, American citizenship is beyond congres-
sional power to withdraw.3 Thus, this little understood but significant
area of the law is once again in a state of disarray.
A. Background
1. The Natural born Citizen
Although the original Constitution used the word "citizen," it
nowhere defined the term or explained how citizenship could be ac-
quired, or whether and how it could be lost.' Prior to the Civil War, the
* Assistant Professor of Government & Public Affairs, Southern Illinois Univer-
sity, Edwardsville, Illinois.
1. 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
2. 401 U.S. 815 (1971).
3. 387 U.S. at 268.
4. The original Constitution refers to citizenship in three different contexts: (1)
eligibility for holding office, art. I, § 2, cl. 2; art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (representatives and
senators); art. II, § 1, cl. 4 (president); (2) cases to which the judicial power extends,
art. III, § 2, cl. 1; and (3) privileges and immunities, art. IV, § 2, cL 1. None of these
provisions, however, attempts to define the citizenship required.
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United States adhered to the doctrine of indelible allegiance, which
originated in the common law. In an American context, indelible alle-
giance meant that birth within the jurisdiction of the United States
created citizenship. The citizen had no right to terminate his allegiance
to the United States without the government's consent.5
Three major changes in citizenship policy accompanied the Civil
War era. First, a statute enacted in 1865 provided that both flight to
avoid conscription and desertion from the armed forces were acts that
indicated the intention of the perpetrators "to have voluntarily relin-
quished and forfeited their rights of citizenship." 6 This statute injected a
notion of volition into the law that persists today. It created an irrefuta-
ble pronouncement which is, at best, logically questionable. This combi-
nation of a legislatively mandated concept of volition and congression-
al assumption of the power to determine that certain conduct is
inconsistent with a desire to retain citizenship represents the most
perplexing problem that plagues any quest to square congressional
power with constitutional limitations.
Indelible allegiance lasted only until 1868, when Congress recog-
nized that "the right of expatriation is a natural and inherent right of all
people, indispensable to the enjoyment of the rights of life, liberty, and
the pursuit of happiness. ' 7 This rather obscure statute made the individ-
ual's truly voluntary action dispositive of his allegiance. It also seemed to
create a simple mechanism for determining whether a citizen actually
wished to expatriate himself: the execution of a formal renunciation of
his citizenship before appropriate diplomatic officials. The determina-
tion of volition, however, has never been limited to a formal renuncia-
tion of citizenship.
Although dormant for a century, the first sentence of the Four-
5. In Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 242, 246 (1830), the Court found that
"[Ithe general doctrine [of citizenship] is, that no persons can, by any act of their own,
without the consent of the government, put off their allegiance, and become aliens." For
a discussion of the problems attendant to the doctrine of indelible allegiance, see G. VoN
GLAnN, LAW AMONG NATIONS 182 (1965) [hereinafter cited as VON GLAHN].
6. Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 79, § 21, 13 Stat. 490. The use of the phrase "rights of
citizenship" is unique in nationality legislation and has not been repeated. In effect, the
government gave its consent to draft dodgers and deserters to "renounce" their citizen-
ship in conformity with the doctrine of indelible allegiance.
7. Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 249, 15 Stat. 223. To a country inundated by
immigrants, most of whom became citizens, indelible allegiance became a paradoxical
doctrine. The United States adhered to it for its own citizens but continued to naturalize
citizens from countries that also adhered to the doctrine. See VoN GLAN, supra note 5,
at 182.
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teenth Amendment8 eventually became the most significant provision
pertaining to citizenship. This citizenship clause made national citizen-
ship primary and state citizenship derivative. More importantly, how-
ever, the clause's absolute language at least suggested the possibility that
an American's citizenship was beyond the reach of congressional power.
Since such a suggestion was incompatible with what courts have viewed
as compelling governmental interests that might necessitate denationali-
zation,9 the Fourteenth Amendment played no role in the controversy
over citizenship until Afroyim.
2. The Naturalized Citizen
Until the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the method of
acquiring citizenship by a person born in the United States was largely a
product of congressional fiat.10 The framers of the Constitution, how-
ever, explicitly gave Congress the sole power to determine the method of
admitting aliens to citizenship. Article I delegated to Congress the power
to "establish a uniform rule of naturalization."'1 While the Supreme
Court has never precisely interpreted the scope of this "rulemaking"
power, the implication has been that this power is analogous to the
power to regulate:' 2 it "is complete in itself, may be exercised to its
8. "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
9. In this article, "denationalization" refers to governmental withdrawal of citizen-
ship regardless of how that citizenship was acquired; "denaturalization" refers to govern-
mental withdrawal of a naturalized citizen's citizenship; and "expatriation" refers to an
individual's voluntary renunciation of citizenship.
10. "Citizenship depends . . . entirely on municipal law and is not regulated by
international law. Acquisition of citizenship of the United States is governed solely by
the Constitution and by Acts of Congress." Tomasicchio v. Acheson, 98 F. Supp. 166,
169 (D.D.C. 1951). Prior to 1868, there was no constitutional mandate on citizenship.
Congress adhered to the doctrine of jus soli, which, like indelible allegiance, was also a
remnant of the British experience: "birth within the limits of the jurisdiction of the
Crown, and of the United States, as the successor of the Crown, fixed nationality, and
. . . there could be no change in this rule of law except by statute .... ." Weedin v.
Chin Bow, 274 U.S. 657, 660 (1927). According to the theory of jus soli, birth in the
United States creates citizenship regardless of the parents' allegiance. The Fourteenth
Amendment formally adopted the jus soli method of determining citizenship. See United
States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898). In some instances, however, the United
States adheres to the doctrine of fus sanguinis under which the child's citizenship or
nationality is determined by his parents' citizenship or nationality regardless of where he
is born. See Act of May 24, 1934, PuB. L. No. 73-250, ch. 344, 48 Stat. 797.
11. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
12. At least modern usage defines a rule as "an authoritative regulation for action,
conduct, method, procedure, arrangement, etc." WEBsm s NEW INTmRNATONAL
DiCnONARY 2182 (2d ed. 1934).
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utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than those which
are prescribed in the constitution."' 3 Logically, such a plenary power
can be used to achieve virtually any public policy objective.14
It is clear that the fulfillment of an alien's desire to attain American
citizenship is completely dependent upon congressional discretion.'5
With regard to those born in the United States, however, the citizenship
clause places at least the acquisition of citizenship beyond the reach of
congressional discretion. Structurally, the Constitution seems to imply
that, once citizenship is attained, all American citizens are similarly situ-
ated relative to the Constitution and laws, regardless of birthplace.'6 For
the most part, however, neither the Supreme Court nor Congress has ac-
cepted this proposition, and congressional power has been used to distin-
guish between the "two citizenships." Moreover, the debate over the
nature of American citizenship has focused on the extent rather than the
existence of congressional power to denationalize an individual despite
the origin of this citizenship. Both "types of citizens" find their citizen-
ship constantly in peril because they might unwittingly commit an act
indicative of a desire to voluntarily expatriate themselves.
B. The Law and Logic of Denationalization
Since passing the Acts of 1865 and 1868,17 Congress has enacted
three major nationality statutes culminating with the Immigration and
13. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824).
14. In Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 417 (1857), the Court
sharply limited congressional power to provide a uniform rule of naturalization by
holding that, since the framers never envisioned black people as part of the American
political community, the Constitution required their exclusion from that community.
Thus, blacks were not citizens of the United States and Congress could not use its
seemingly plenary power to alter their alien status. Id. at 426. Nor was the Dred Scott
limitation the only curb on congressional power over nationality that the Court imposed
during the nineteenth century. In United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898),
the Court severely limited congressional power to define the phrase "subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States," a power which, according to section 5, should have
been included in Congress' power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 695-96.
15. Clearly, Congress could validly bar all naturalization by simply failing to pass a
rule. Once Congress elects to pass a rule, however, it is a live issue whether conditions
can be imposed on the alien or former alien that could not be validly imposed on natural-
born citizens. See text accompanying notes 21-39 infra.
16. Article I, section 8 enumerates congressional powers. It is a well established
rule of construction that an enumeration in a legal instrument denies all items not
enumerated unless incident to an expressly enumerated item. United States v. Harris, 106
U.S. 629, 636 (1883). In Terada v. Dulles, 121 F. Supp. 6 (D. Haw. 1954), the court
rejected the government's contention that the power to denaturalize was a necessary and
proper incident of the power to naturalize.
17. See notes 5 and 6 supra.
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Nationality Act of 1952.18 Twentieth century nationality legislation
illustrates the expanding power that Congress has assumed over the
retention of citizenship. Section 349 of the Act of 1952 lists ten actions
that indicate a citizen's desire to "voluntarily" expatriate himself, in-
cluding service in a foreign army, taking an oath of allegiance to a
foreign state, voting in a foreign election, desertion from the armed
forces, and treason against the United States.19
The rationale behind this list is anything but a benevolent attempt
to facilitate the individual's right of expatriation since all a citizen need
do to avail himself of that right is to execute a formal renunciation.
Rather, Congress decided that certain activities were inconsistent with
the national interest and prescribed denationalization as the penalty for
engaging in such activities. Although there is seemingly no rational
nexus between commission of these acts and the desire to forfeit Ameri-
can citizenship, commission is tantamount to executing a formal renun-
ciation.
The actions established by section 349 as indicative of a relinquish-
ment of United States citizenship apply to all citizens. Section 340 of the
Act of 1952 provides additional actions for which only a naturalized
citizen can lose his citizenship. These include the individual's refusal to
testify within ten years of attaining citizenship before a congressional
committee that is investigating his subversive activities, when such re-
fusal results in a contempt conviction. Also included is affiliation within
five years of naturalization with any organization, membership in which
would have precluded the individual's naturalization. 0 Unlike section
349, there is no pretense of volition in section 340. Rather, section 340
18. Act of June 27, 1952, PuB. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 [hereinafter cited as
Act of 1952]. The other major statutes were the Act of Oct. 14, 1940, PUn. L. No. 76-
853, 54 Stat. 1137 and the Act of June 29, 1906, Put. L. No. 59-338, 34 Stat. 596.
19. The other grounds are: obtaining naturalization in a foreign state, performing a
job or service in a foreign state when the performer either has or acquires that state's
nationality, formal renunciation of citizenship in the United States, formal renunciation
abroad and leaving or remaining outside the United States during either a war or a
national emergency for the purpose of evading military service. Act of 1952, 66 Stat.
267-68.
20. The third offense is remaining outside the United States, within five years of
naturalization, for the purpose of residing in a foreign country. Such conduct was prima
facie evidence of a lack of intent to reside in the United States as required by the
naturalization oath. Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 261. In Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168-
69 (1964), the Court invalidated section 352(a)(1) of the Act of 1952, which, like
section 340, provided for the denaturalization of those residing abroad. See text accompa-
nying notes 70-72 infra. Unlike section 340, there was no five year limit attached to the
applicability of section 352(a)(1). Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 261, 269.
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specifies that commission of any of these "offenses" constitute prima
facie evidence that the individual perjured himself when he swore that he
was of good moral character and "attached to the principles of the Con-
stitution."21 Thus, section 340 singles out the naturalized citizen for
special surveillance, and mandates a heavy penalty for his engaging in
proscribed conduct. 2
There are important constitutional problems attending both the
definition of "voluntariness" in the Act of 1952 and its prescription of
what constitutes prima facie evidence of perjury. First, while the con-
gressional desire to protect the nation's foreign policy from private
intrusions and to discourage actions that might cause embarrassment is
certainly legitimate, it is much less certain whether the intruder's dena-
tionalization is a constitutionally proper response to the problem. Afro-
yim purported to authoritatively resolve this problem. There is an-
other question, however, that has never been resolved. Although
Congress clearly has a significant interest in preserving the integrity of
the naturalization process against fraud, it is quite another matter
whether this concern can be translated into a withdrawal of citizenship
on account of an individual's exercise of constitutionally protected
rights.
21. Section 316(a) of the Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 242, requires that applicants for
naturalization be of good moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitution,
and disposed to the good order and happiness of the United States. Section 313(a) of
the Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 240-41, lists the types of activities, beliefs and affiliations that
constitute a bar to naturalization. For a good overview of some of the litigation that
has arisen under section 316(a), see W. Blsuop, INTERNATIONAL LAw 522-24 (3d ed.
1971).
The bulk of litigation that has reached the Supreme Court involves the attachment
requirement. See, e.g., Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946); United States v.
MacIntosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931); United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929).
The most interesting cases involve the relationship between attachment and post-
naturalization affiliations. See, e.g., Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654 (1946);
Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665 (1944); Schneiderman v. United States, 320
U.S. 118 (1943). In these cases the government sought to revoke naturalization on the
grounds that their Communist and Nazi affiliations indicated that the applicants lied
when they swore that they were attached to the principles of the Constitution. In each
case, the Court adhered to the view that the government's mistakes in not scrutinizing
naturalization applications more closely were "not to be corrected by meagre standards
for disproving such allegiance retrospectively." 322 U.S. 665, 675. The government bore
a heavy burden of proving that its evidence of lack of attachment was "clear, un-
equivocal, and convincing." 320 U.S. 118, 125.
22. Congress provided additional surveillance by enacting the Expatriation Act of
1954, 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(9) (1970), which prescribes loss of citizenship for rebellion,
insurrection and seditious conspiracy as those terms were defined by the Smith Act (18
U.S.C. 2384 et seq.). For an analysis of this statute's constitutionality, see Comment,
The Expropriation Act of 1954, 64 YALE L.J. 1164 (1955).
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1. An Analysis of Section 340
The theory underlying the distinctly second class citizenship that
results from section 340 is that, since naturalization is a privilege, the
grantor, Congress, can impose conditions on the recipient with an aim
toward insuring that all prerequisites have been honestly fulfilled. Thus,
a certificate of naturalization is "open like other public grants to be
revoked if and when it shall be found to have been unlawfully or
fraudulently procured.128 It is easy to accept the premise that "the rights.
of the naturalized citizen derive from satisfying, free of fraud, the
requirements set by Congress . ",24 Clearly, there exists no consti-
tutional right to be naturalized or to retain citizenship that has been
fraudulently procured. However, the legitimacy of governmental power
to infer perjury and revoke citizenship on the basis of the naturalized
citizen's exercise of rights that the Constitution protects is not nearly so
clear.
Congressional power to mandate what is tantamount to a loyalty
oath as a prerequisite to attaining citizenship cannot be successfully
controverted. A prospective citizen's loyalty and his past activities are
patently legitimate congressional concerns. But the mere validity of an
oath does not logically sanction the principle that, as a condition of
attaining citizenship, the recipient can be forced to surrender rights that
every natural born citizen possesses.25
The right-privilege dichotomy has challenged the Supreme Court
23. Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227, 238 (1912). The Court took the
position that, since naturalization was a privilege, denaturalization and deportation were
simply civil proceedings and so did not have to conform to the requirements for criminal
proceedings that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments mandate. See text accompanying notes
28-29 infra.
24. Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 166 (1964).
25. "A naturalized citizen is indeed made a citizen under an Act of Congress, but
the act does not proceed to give, to regulate, or to prescribe his capacities. He becomes a
member of the society, possessing all the rights of a native citizen, and standing, in the
view of the constitution, on the footing of a native. The constitution does not authorize
Congress to enlarge or abridge those rights. The simple power of the national Legisla-
ture, is to prescribe a uniform rule of naturalization, and the exercise of this power
exhausts it, so far as respects the individual." Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat) 738, 827 (1824). In Afroyim, Justice Harlan rejected the use of Osborn
as a precedent since Chief Justice Marshall's remarks are taken from a context that
render them meaningless with regard to citizenship. 387 U.S. 253 at 275-76. Indeed, the
Osborn decision neither has nor purports to have anything to do with citizenship.
Marshall simply contrasted a naturalized citizen, who, he thought, was made "total" by
the act of naturalization with a bank, whose charter gave it all the rights and capacities it
possessed
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since the advent of loyalty oaths.2" Although the government can require
the individual to sacrifice the unfettered exercise of certain constitutional
rights if it has a compelling interest contrary to such an exercise,27 the
fact that naturalization is a privilege is not dispositive of the validity of
section 340. It is clear that the First Amendment guarantee of associa-
tion28 and the Fifth Amendment guarantees of equal protection 9 and
against self-incrimination apply to all persons in the United States, not
solely to citizens or to natural born citizens. Yet section 340 forces the
naturalized citizen to choose between exercising his constitutional rights
and retaining his citizenship. Indeed, with regard to the membership
and testimony provisions of section 340, the naturalized citizen's
"choice" is completely illusory. If he refuses to testify and is convicted
for contempt, he loses his citizenship; if he testifies and reveals his
affiliations, he may lose his citizenship for "fraud."
In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,80 the Court held that withdraw-
al of citizenship for evading service in the nation's armed forces was
punishment, which could be imposed only after all of the Constitution's
procedural safeguards had been afforded the accused. Thus, section 340
seems constitutionally deficient not only because it inflicts punishment
26. See Van Alstyne. The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitu-
tional Law, 81 HRv. L REv. 1439 (1968); French, Unconstitutional Conditions: An
Analysis, 50 GEO. LJ. 234 (1961); Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARV. L
Rnv. 1595 (1960). These commentators contend that any legal distinction between a
right and a privilege is virtually nonexistent in respect to a legislature's power to
arbitrarily deprive an individual of a privilege that it has previously granted.
27. See, e.g., United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947); Ex Parte
Curtis, 106 U.S. 371 (1882) (upholding statutes that restricted the political activities of
certain federal employees).
28. The First Amendment, of course, mentions no right of freedom of association.
In N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958), however, the Court found it
"beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and
ideas is an inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause. .... "
29. In Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), the Court found the notion of equal
protection of the laws to be an integral part of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause.
30. 372 U.S. 144 (1963). This decision seems to overrule sub silentio the Johannes-
sen decision, supra note 23. Mendoza arose under section 401(j) of the Act of 1940,
which was the predecessor to section 349(a) (10) of the Act of 1952. The Court held
that "Congress has plainly employed the sanction of deprivation of nationality as a
punishment for the offense of leaving or remaining outside the country to evade
military service without affording the procedural safeguards guaranteed by the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments." 372 U.S. 144, 165-66. The Court rejected the contention
that, unless they lose their citizenship, deserters would go unpunished since "without
being expatriated, the evader living abroad is not in a position to assert the vast majority
of his component rights as an American citizen." Id. at 184.
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for the assertion of constitutional rights, but also because it fails to
provide appropriate procedural guarantees. It is also significant that
section 340 fails to consider the quality of membership in subversive
organizations. Recent decisions have held that such consideration is
necessary in order to avoid the defect of overbreadth.3'
It should not be inferred that Congress lacks power to provide rules
of evidence in judicial, quasi-judicial, and denaturalization proceedings.
The Fifth Amendment's due process clause, however, limits congressional
power to prescribe such rules. Presumably, Congress could remedy the
procedural defects of section 340 in light of Mendoza as long as the
scheme it provides adheres to the following standard:
[A] legislative presumption of one fact from evidence of another
may not constitute a denial of due process of law or a denial of the
equal protection of the law [but] it is only essential that there
shall be some rational connection between the fact proved and the
ultimate fact presumed, and that the inference of one fact from
proof of another shall not be so unreasonable as -to be a purely arbi-
trary mandate. So, also, it must not, under guise of regulating the
presentation of evidence, operate to preclude the party from the
right to present his defense to the main fact thus presumed. 32
Two factors seem to vitiate the existence of a rational connection
between the failure to fulfill the mandates of section 340 and the
inference of perjury in the oath. First, it is difficult to accept, as a logical
proposition, that Congress can admit an individual to citizenship and
then punish him for exercising freedoms that are crucial to that commu-
nity's existence.13 It is certainly conceivable that an individual could
31. See, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); note 33 infra.
32. Mobile, J. & K.C. R.R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 43 (1910). See also Tot v.
United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943) (presumption that the possession of a firearm by a
fugitive was illegal under the Federal Firearms Act was arbitrary); Taylor v. Georgia,
315 U.S. 25 (1942), and Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911) (presumptions of
intent to defraud from the failure to perform work for which an advance payment was
made was arbitrary). The Court has, however, upheld many presumptions. See, e.g., Yee
Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178 (1925) (presumption that one possessing opium had
illegally imported it upheld); Hawes v. Georgia, 258 U.S. 1 (1922) (presumption that
the owner of the premises on which distilling apparatus was seized knew of its presence
is valid); Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904) (presumption that possession of
policy slips was "knowing" held valid); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698
(1893) (presumption that, if a Chinese alien could not produce a residence certificate on
demand, he was in the country illegally was valid). In each case, the presumed fact was
made prima facie evidence of guilt. This meant that the burden of proof was shifted from
the government to the accused who was compelled to rebut the presumption.
33. Indeed, section 340 seems to strongly resemble many cases in which the Court
has invalidated laws because of their "chilling effect" on protected freedoms. See, e.g.,
DuBois Clubs of America v. Clark, 389 U.S. 309, 317-18 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissent-
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faithfully subscribe to the naturalization oath, yet later, in the atmos-
phere of political freedom that may have motivated his desire to seek
citizenship, elect a course of conduct that conflicts with section 340.
In addition to the absence of the rational nexus between testimony,
membership and denaturalization that the due process clause requires,
section 340 raises important equal protection issues. Clearly, the statute
treats native born and naturalized citizens differently, but, of course,
differential treatment is not in and of itself dispositive of a law's uncon-
stitutionality. The crucial issue is whether the classification is designed
"so as not to discriminate between ... inhabitants except upon some
reasonable differentiation fairly related to the object of regulation. ' 4 In
the indiscriminate lumping together of all naturalized citizens guilty of
the specified offenses and the presumption that their naturalization was
fraudulently procured without any requirement that evidence of actual
fraud be adduced, section 340 is so overinclusive 5 that it invidiously
discriminates against naturalized citizens.
In Afroyim, the Court accepted the principle that "[clitizenship,
like freedom of speech, press, and religion, occupies a preferred position
in our written Constitution. . .. "36 If citizenship is a preferred or
fundamental right,87 then the government must bear the burden of
ing); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449
(1958). While section 340's stated intention of preventing fraud is clearly legitimate,
"that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal
liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved." 364 U.S. 479, 488.
34. Railway Express v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
35. Overinclusiveness means that a statute's regulations apply to some persons who
do not possess the characteristics the statute seeks to regulate. See Tussman & tenBroek,
The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALiF. L. REv. 341, 348 (1949). Since perfect
inclusiveness, in which everyone possessing the traits the statute describes is included in
its regulatory scheme and no one who does not possess those traits is included, is
virtually impossible to achieve, it is never a test of constitutionality. Rather, there seems
to be a judicially ascertainable amount of tolerable variation from perfection that the
Court discovers on a case by case basis. Thus, in Perez v. Brownell: "The fatal defect in
the statute before us is that its application is not limited to those situations that may
rationally be said to constitute an abandonment of citizenship. In specifying that any act
of voting in a foreign political election results in loss of citizenship, Congress has
employed a classification so broad that it encompasses conduct that fails to show a
voluntary abandonment of American citizenship." 356 U.S. 44, 76 (1958) (Warren, C.
J., dissenting).
36. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 84 (1958) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
37. The preferred position doctrine is usually associated with First Amendment
freedoms. Its origin is probably in Justice Harlan F. Stone's footnote in United States v.
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938): "It is unnecessary to consider
now whether legislation which restricts those political processes [that the Bill of Rights
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proving that section 340 both serves a compelling interest and is the
least drastic method by which that interest can be accomplished."8 It is
difficult to accept section 340's implicit logic that either the national
interest or the integrity of the naturalization process would be compro-
mised if a naturalized citizen exercised constitutionally guaranteed
rights. At minimum, there would seem to exist other methods of satisfy-
ing the legitimate governmental interests involved that avoid most signi-
ficant constitutional questions.
Moreover, since the Act of 1952 gives the government the power to
challenge any naturalization application in court,"' the sole function of
section 340 seems to be to give the government the opportunity to
correct the investigatory inadequacies that resulted in its failure to
contest the naturalization decree. On balance, the individual's constitu-
tional rights seem to outweigh the need for the type of retrospective
scrutiny that section 340 embodies. Although the provisions of section
340 have never been litigated,40 they nonetheless remain a threat to the
freedom of naturalized Americans.
C. Afroyim v. Rusk: Sound and Fury
Until the sixties, the federal courts rarely challenged congressional
primacy in nationality matters. Even in the twenties and early thirties
protects] which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legisla-
tion, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny. . . than are most other types
of legislation." With the advent of the notion of fundamental rights protected by the
equal protection clause, however, "more exacting judicial scrutiny" became the only
standard that the Court found acceptable in evaluating the constitutionality of "Undesir-
able legislation." Thus, "strict scrutiny of the classification which a State makes.... is
essential, lest unwittingly, or otherwise, invidious discriminations are made
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
38. While citizenship has never been held to be either a preferred or a fundamental
right, it could be argued that denationalization is as devastating to the vindication of
rights as is other "undesirable legislation." See note 63 infra. If this is so, then the
alternative means doctrine places the burden on the government either to adopt other
methods or to prove that other methods do not exist. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 407-09 (1963); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 610 (1961) (Brennan,J.,
concurring and dissenting).
39. Section 336(d) of the Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 258, gives the government power lo
contest a naturalization petition in Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227 (1912),
the Court held that the doctrine of res judicata did not estop the government from later
instituting proceedings to revoke a fraudulently procured naturalization certificate since
the original proceeding was not adversary. Comment, Denaturalization Under The Im-
migration and Nationality Act of 1952, 51 MicH. L. Rav. 881, 883 n.8 (1953).
40. In Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964), the Court invalidated a law that
contained a residence requirement very similar to that of section 340. But see Luria v.
United States, 231 U.S. 9 (1913).
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when the Court carefully scrutinized congressional motives in enacting
legislation,"' nationality laws were shielded from legitimate constitution-
al inquiry by the notion that it was beyond the competence of the
judiciary to examine matters so intimately involved with foreign affairs.
Courts implicitly accepted the argument that the denationalization fea-
tures of nationality laws were designed merely to facilitate the individu-
al's right to voluntary expatriation. Thus, withdrawal of citizenship was
generally treated as a matter of statutory interpretation.42
The possibility that a new theory of American citizenship might be
emerging was signalled by two significant decisions in 1958. In Perez v.
Brownell,4 the government attempted to deport Perez, a natural born
citizen, on the grounds that he had voluntarily relinquished his citizen-
ship by voting in an election in Mexico. A five judge majority rejected
the contention that the Fourteenth Amendments first sentence restricted
congressional power to remove citizenship 44 and argued that the nation
could protect itself from embarrassment arising from the actions of
private citizens abroad by divorcing itself from such individuals.45 The
Court held that the congressional determination that participation by
Americans in foreign elections could adversely affect the conduct of
foreign affairs and could cause international tensions was a reasonable
one.
41. See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936); Bailey v. Drexel Furniture
Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). It was not until
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116 (1941) that the Court decided: 'rhe thesis
...that the motive of the prohibition ...can operate to deprive the regulation of its
constitutional authority has long ceased to have force . .. ."
42. In Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915), which was the first case involving
a native born American's denationalization, the Court argued that the withdrawal of a
woman's citizenship because she married an alien was valid despite the fact that the
couple resided in the United States. Thus, "judicial opinion has taken for granted Ithat
this exercise of congressional power] would not only be valid but demanded" since an
American woman's marriage to an alien might cause the government embarrassment. Id.
at 312. For this reason, the Court thought that Mrs. Mackenzie's denationalization was
"as voluntary and distinctive as expatriation and its consequences must be considered as
elected." Id. (emphasis supplied). Similarly, in Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 329 (1939),
the Court held: "As at birth she became a citizen of the United States, that citizenship
must be deemed to continue unless she has been deprived of it through the operation of
a treaty or congressional enactment or by her voluntary action in conformity with
applicable legal principles." In neither of these cases did the Court seriously entertain the
possibility that what judicial opinion had taken for granted might be wrong.
43. 356 U.S. 44 (1958). The case was litigated under section 401(e) of the Act of
1940, 54 Stat. 1169, which is identical to its successor, section 349(a) (5) of the Act of
1952, 66 Stat. 268.
44. Id. at 58 n.3.
45. Id. at 60-62.
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Obviously, the significance of Perez does not lie in the majority's
holding, which closely parallels earlier decisions.46 For the first time,
however, a strongly worded dissenting opinion objected to the tradition-
al American theory of congressional power over citizenship. Speaking
for the four dissenters, Chief Justice Earl Warren disagreed with the
argument that the Fourteenth Amendment was irrelevant in determining
the scope of congressional power. The dissenters contended that Ameri-
can citizenship was much too precious to be entrusted to congressional
whim:
Whatever may be the scope of its powers to regulate the conduct
and aff-airs of all persons within its jurisdiction, a government of
the people cannot take away their citizenship simply because one
branch of that government can be said to have a conceivably
rational basis for wanting to do so. 47
Warren's dissenting opinion in Perez had to wait nearly a decade
before it was adopted by a majority in Afroyim. On the same day as
Perez, however, the Court invalidated the government's attempt to
denationalize a deserter from the armed forces. In Trop v. Dulles,4" the
Perez dissenters were joined by Justice William J. Brennan.49 This new
majority reasoned that denationalization simply was not related ra-
tionally to the power to wage war.6 0 Significantly, a majority could
not agree that there were no circumstances under which the government
might legitimately denationalize an individual. The two cases are impor-
tant because the size and intensity of the dissent in Perez and the close
scrutiny of the rational nexus underlying governmental power by the
majority in Trop foreshadowed an impending change in the law. The
Court demonstrated a willingness to shed its passivity and actively
46. Perez relies heavily on Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915), and on
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
47. 356 U.S. 44, 65 (Warren, C. J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
48. 356 U.S. 86 (1958). Trap was litigated under section 401(g) of the Act of
1940, 54 Stat. 1169, which is identical to its successor, section 349(a)(8) of the Act of
1952, 66 Stat. 268.
49. There indeed seems to be a paradox between Brennan's votes in Perez and
Trap, the former to sustain the denationalization of one who had committed no crime,
the latter to affirm the citizenship of a convicted deserter. He explains: "Congress'
asserted power to expatriate the deserter bears to the war powers precisely the same
relation as its power to expatriate the tax evader would bear to the taxing power." Trap
v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 113 (1958). Since he could not see the rationality of the latter
exercise, he could not see the rationality of the former either. It was not until Afroyim
that Justice Brennan accepted the thesis that the Fourteenth Amendment precluded
denationalization regardless of its rationality.
50. Five judges could not accept Chief Justice Warren's conclusion that "citizenship
is not subject to the general powers of the National Government. . . . " 356 U.S. at 92.
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examine not only the relevancy of legislation to some legitimate govern-
mental purpose but also the constitutional rationale underlying dena-
tionalization to insure that withdrawals of citizenship were not inconsis-
tent with constitutional guarantees.
The landmark case in nationality is Afroyim v. Rusk,5 in which
the Court overruled Perez. The lower courts had relied on Perez in
affirming Afroyim's denationalization for voting in an Israeli parlia-
mentary election. In a 5 to 4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed, and
the majority was able to unite behind Justice Hugo Black's opinion.
The Court began its inquiry by "resurrecting" the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's citizenship clause, and held that, while the clause was designed
primarily to overrule Dred Scott,52 it was also a restriction on the
national government's power to tamper with citizenship. Afroyim is
probably best noted for the following characterization of American
citizenship:
We hold that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to, and
does, protect every citizen of .this nation against a congressional
forcible destruction of his citizenship . . . Our holding does no
more than give -to this citizen -that which is his own, a constitutional
right to remain a citizen in a free country unless he voluntarily re-
linquishes that citizenship.53
There are, 'however, great legal difficulties attendant to this simple,
definitive sounding principle.
The Court's holding in Afroyim is based totally on the notion of
volition. Clearly, the Court was not attempting to disparage congression-
al power to facilitate voluntary expatriation. Rather, the Court interpret-
ed the citizenship clause to prohibit involuntary withdrawals of citizen-
ship so that only the citizen's voluntary action can affect the retention of
his citizenship.
This reasoning, however, appears to miss the most crucial aspect of
denationalization as it has been practiced. The Act of 1952, as well as
all prior nationality statutes, is couched in terms of volition. Indeed,
after listing the ten actions that result in "voluntary expatriation,"
section 349(b) of the Act of 1952 provides:
51. 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
52. "It is true that the chief interest of the people in giving permanence and
security to citizenship in the Fourteenth Amendment was the desire to protect
Negroes .... This undeniable purpose . . . would be frustrated by holding that the
Government can rob a citizen of his citizenship without his consent by simply proceeding
to act under an implied general power to regulate foreign affairs .... " 387 U.S. 253,
262-63.
53. Id. at 268.
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Any person who commits or performs any act specified in subsec-
tion (a) shall be conclusively presumed to have done so voluntarily
and without having been subjected to duress of any kind... . 14
By terms of section 349(a), when an individual engages in one of
the ten listed activities he has voluntarily expatriated himself. He has not
had his citizenship revoked by legislative fiat or by an intricate pro-
cedure that balances American foreign policy with individual freedom.
Significantly, at least on its face, this "voluntary" action is all that
Afroyim seems to require.58
Taken literally, Afroyim is without meaning since no one has ever
lost his citizenship by anything other than his own "voluntary action."
Since 1868, when Congress recognized the right of voluntary expatria-
tion, denationalization legislation has been disguised as a simple facilita-
tion of that right. As is obvious from litigation that has followed the
commission of these voluntary acts, loss of citizenship was seldom the
individual's real desire.""
In order to have any significance, Afroyim must be read to hold
that, although Congress can provide a mechanism by which the individ-
ual can voluntarily expatriate himself, volition is now a judicially ascer-
tainable quality, and the government must bear the burden of proving
54. 66 Stat. 268. The only individuals eligible to raise a defense of duress are those
who are neither nationals of the state in which the "offense" was committed nor had
spent the preceding ten years in that foreign state. For an example of the difficulties of
proving duress, see Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717 (1952).
55. "[The Court] has assumed that voluntariness is here a term of fixed meaning;
in fact, of course, it has been employed to describe both a specific intent to renounce
citizenship, and the uncoerced commission of an act conclusively deemed by law to be a
relinquishment of citizenship. Until the Court indicates with greater precision what it
means by 'assent,' today's opinion will surely cause still greater confusion . . . . " 387
U.S. at 269 n.1 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Even under the most normal seeming circum-
stances, reasonable men can differ over what constitutes volition. In Jolley v. Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service, 441 F.2d 1245, 1251 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
946 (1971), a divided court held that Jolley's formal renunciation of citizenship, which
he executed in Toronto, for the purpose of evading the draft, was voluntary. Judge Rives
dissented and argued that Jolley's abhorence of the draft and his battle with his local
board, which would not give him conscientious objector status, might have put him in
such a psychological state that his renunciation was involuntary. Most commentators,
however, argue that volition must be defined in terms of a formal renunciation of
citizenship. Note, "Voluntary Relinquishment" of American Citizenship: A Proposed
Definition, 53 CORNELL L R v. 325 (1968); Comment, Expatriation: Demise of the
"Rational Nexus," 12 U.C.L.A.L, REv. 510 (1965); Note, "Voluntary": A Concept in
Expatriation Law, 54 COLUM. L. Rnv. 932 (1954).
56. See, e.g., Kazdy-Reich v. Marshall, 88 F. Supp. 787 (D. Colum. 1950) in which
the Court upheld the revocation of a woman's citizenship despite the uncontroverted
testimony that she was a completely loyal American who had voted in a Hungarian
election for the sole purpose of defeating communism. See also note 65 infra.
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that the citizen's renunciation was truly voluntary. Afroyim makes the
statutory presumption of volition rebuttable rather than legally absolute.
Afroyim's only concession to the past was a footnote in which the Court
acknowledged that the citizenship clause did not protect perpetrators of
fraud.57 The government still possesses the power to institute proceed-
ings for revocation, but Afroyim indicates that the Court will carefully
scrutinize the charges to insure that the alleged fraud involved, either
lying about or concealing a fact that was material at the time the
application was filed.58 It is highly doubtful that section 340's "inferen-
tial fraud" provisions are consistent with Afroyim's narrow view of the
permissible grounds for revocation.
Afroyim is probably the first specific modem limitation on what
has been recognized as the government's inherent power to conduct
foreign affairs."' In holding that the power to denationalize was a
natural concomitant of the power to conduct foreign affairs, the Perez
majority had not written on a clean slate. In both United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. and Fong Yue Ting v. United States,0 the
Court's acknowledgement of the existence of inherent powers in foreign
affairs seemed to support the Perez majority's conclusion. In a sense,
Justice John M. Harlan's complaint that the Afr6yim majority's absolute
view of the *citizenship clause failed "almost entirely to dispute the
reasoning in Perez''61 is true. In a broader sense, however, the Court did
not have to come to grips with this reasoning precisely because of its
57. "Of course ... naturalization unlawfully procured can be set aside." 387 U.S.
at 267 n.23.
58. Since denationalization has been held to be punishment, supra note 30, which
must be preceded by procedural safeguards, any judicial proceeding to denaturalize for
-fraud must be governed by the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, which has
been held to be an essential part of the liberty protected by the due process clause. In Re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
59. The Constitution does not specifically mention a "foreign affairs" power and
the Constitution's structural philosophy, infra note 60, seems to vitiate any doctrine of
inherent powers. In Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311 (1915), however, the Court
found that a plenary power over foreign affairs was "an attribute of sovereignty." This
theory was heartily endorsed in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Co., 299 U.S.
304 (1936).
60. In Curtiss-Wright, the Court held that "the investment of the federal govern-
ment with the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants
of the Constitution. The powers to declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to make
treaties, to maintain diplomatic relations with other sovereignties, if they had never been
mentioned in the Constitution, would have vested in the federal government as necessary
concomitants of nationality." Id. at 318. In Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S.
698, 707-10 (1892), the Court reviewed and cited approvingly various authorities who
argued in support of inherent powers in foreign affairs.
61. 387 U.S. 253, 269 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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view of the citizenship clause. Whatever the necessities of modem
foreign policy might be, the Fourteenth Amendment simply did not
permit the involuntary withdrawal of citizenship.
The Court's decision in Afroyim seemed to effectively raise citizen-
ship to the status of a fundamental personal right in much the same
manner as the Warren Court selected other interests and similarly
elevated them during the sixties. 62 As with the creation of other funda-
mental rights, citizenship's apparent elevation was accompanied by a
vigorous dissenting view. As they did so often in the past, Justices Black
and Harlan found that yet another part of the Fourteenth Amendment
could be construed to mean two very different -things.63 Each side fails,
however, to overcome a significant problem with its position.
On the one hand, since the nature of American citizenship was so
vague in 1868, it is debatable whether the Fourteenth Amendment's
first sentence was designed to affect congressional power over citizen-
ship at all. Justice Harlan argues with some persuasiveness that the
citizenship clause:
neither denies nor provides -to Congress any power of expatriation;
its consequences are... exhausted by its declaration of the classes
of individuals to whom citizenship initially attaches. 64
It would be arguably paradoxical if, given its location in an amendment
designed to limit state power and increase national power over the
states,6 5 the citizenship clause was intended to be more than a truism
asserting the primacy of national citizenship over state citizenship.
62. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394. U.S. 618 (1969) (interstate travel); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (marriage); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500
(1964) (international travel); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (fairly appor-
tioned electoral districts); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (education).
But see San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
63. The two have sharply disagreed over the mandates of the equal protection
clause regarding apportionment, Hadley v. Junior College District, 397 U.S. 50 (1970);
over the extent of the "Miranda warning," Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968);
and over whether a judge's comment on a defendant's failure to testify comported with
due process, Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). In Afroyim, their clash
demonstrates the enormous difficulty in trying to divine the intent of the framers. Both
point to emphatic statements made during the congressional debates over the Fourteenth
Amendment to vindicate their arguments and neither seems particularly more persuasive
than the other. 387 U.S. at 258, 287. A careful study of the debates does not seem to
shed any light on the essential debate: whether the framers of the citizenship clause
intended to restrict whatever power Congress might have had to withdraw citizenship.
The crucial point might be that, since the Constitution nowhere mentions a power to
denationalize, any restriction on such a power by the citizenship clause would have been
superfluous.
64. 387 U.S. at 292 (Harlan, J., dissenting opinion).
65. The Court used this type of argument to decide that the necessary and proper
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On the other hand, however, it would have been utterly remarkable
if, given their much-fabled concern for securing liberty against govern-
mental oppression, the framers of the Constitution, the Bill of Rights,
and the Fourteenth Amendment had left citizenship to a particular era's
conception of the necessities of its foreign policy. Such a conclusion
means that great pains were taken to insure the liberty of those in the
United States, but nothing whatsoever was done to secure their right to
remain in the United States. Without citizenship, one is an alien subject
to deportation virtually at the host country's pleasure. In a real sense,
denationalization:
is a form of punishment more primitive than torture, for it
destroys for the individual the political existence that was centuries
in the development. The punishment strips the citizen of his status
in the national and international political community [for][iun short, the expatriate has lost the right to have rights.66
Thus, Afroyim's unequivocal terms belie very real difficulties un-
derlying the attempt to pinpoint the relationship between American
citizenship and governmental power. Whatever its shortcomings might
be, however, Afroyim establishes that, unless the government can prove
otherwise, denationalization is presumed to be involuntary when the
victim complains that it is.6T While even the most fundamental right
could theoretically be abridged if the government demonstrates a com-
pelling interest that cannot be achieved in a less drastic fashion, Afroy-
im held that the government's legitimate interest in conducting foreign
affairs unencumbered by the interference of private citizens was not a
sufficiently compelling reason to denationalize those who interfere.
D. Rogers v. Beflei: Two Steps Backward
Whenever there is a radical upheaval in the Supreme Courf's
personnel in a relatively short time, the possibility of a retreat from
clause of Article I, section 8 was an addition to rather than a limitation on congressional
power. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 419-20 (1819).
66. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101-02 (1958).
67. In Afroyim, the Court sidestepped the problem of objective and subjective
intent. Since "effective use of voluntary expatriation. . . required a profound change in
the meaning of 'voluntary."' Congress adopted such a change in section 349(b) of the
Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 268. Thus, Congress simply attempted to dispense "with the
requirement of subjective intent to renounce nationality by indicating that mere perform-
ance of one of the designated acts should operate automatically to divest American
citizenship ...and this standard was satisfied by a showing that performance of the
designated act was voluntary." Comment, The Expatriation Act of 1954, 64 YALE UJ.




the principles enunciated in closely divided decisions occurs. Such a
retreat from the principles of Afroyim seems to be implied by the Burger
Court's 8 decision in Rogers v. Bellei.0 9
Bellei was born and always resided in Italy. Although his father
was a natural born citizen of Italy, Bellei acquired American citizenship
at birth pursuant to a 1934 law,70 which provided that a child born
outside the United States to an alien and a citizen was a citizen. Since
Bellei's mother was an American citizen, he became a citizen. Section
301(b) of the Act of 1952, however, mandated loss of citizenship by
those who had not lived in the United States for at least five years prior
to their twenty-eighth birthday.71 Although Bellei had registered under
the Selective Service Act and had visited the United States five separate
times, he had never resided here. After several warnings from immigra-
tion officials, his citizenship was revoked.
The district court"2 relied on Afroyim and on Schneider v. Rusk7"
to justify its decision to reinstate Bellei's citizenship. In Schneider, the
Supreme Court had invalidated section 352(a) (1) of the Act of 1952,
which made a naturalized citizen's residence abroad for three years in
the nation of his former citizenship grounds for denaturalization.7 4 Sig-
nificantly, Schneider did not condemn the residence restriction per se.
Rather, the Court reasoned that the statute's applicability to only natu-
ralized citizens was invidiously discriminatory since it presumed that
residence abroad by- such citizens was somehow inconsistent with the
obligations of naturalized citizenship. In Bellei, the district court con-
cluded that, as with section 352(a)(1) in Schneider, section 301(b)
lacked the reqaisite rational basis needed to sustain its discriminatory
treatment of American citizens who chose not to fulfill the statute's
residence requirement. 75
68. The Burger Court that rendered the Bellei decision included Chief Justice
Warren E. Burger and Justice Harry A. Blackmun. They replaced Chief Justice Warren
and Justice Fortas who had been part of the Afroyim majority. The "full" Burger Court
was not constituted until the addition of Justices Powell and Rehnquist to replace Harlan
and Black in 1972.
69. 401 U.S. 815 (1971).
70. Act of May 24, 1934, PuD. L. No. 73-250, ch. 344, 48 Stat. 797. Section
301(a) (7) of the Act of 1952 is the successor of the 1934 law.
71. 66 Stat. 236.
72. Bellei v. Rusk, 296 F. Supp. 1247 (D.D.C. 1969).
73. 377 U.S..163 (1964).
74. The statute distinguishes between residence in the state of former nationality,
for which the permissible duration is three years, section 352(a)(1) and residence in
another state, for which the permissible duration is five years, section 352(a) (2).
75. The district court recognized that "Etlhere is an undeniable danger that
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Afroyim seemed to mandate affirmation of the district court's
decision. While Schneider had held out the possibility that congressional
power could be validly used to declare that living abroad was inconsist-
ent with the retention of American citizenship, 76 Afroyim's declaration
of the virtual77 indestructibility of American citizenship seemed to rule
out the possibility. Clearly, Bellei's failure to fulfill the residence pre-
scription of section 301(b) was not the truly voluntary renunciation of
citizenship that the Fourteenth Amendment required since he had une-
quivocally indicated a desire to retain his American citizenship.78 Also,
since Bellei's activities in Italy such as voting, employment, military
service, etc.,79 were never a part of any judicial proceeding, the govern-
ment would have been hard pressed to demonstrate the specific com-
pelling interest that motivated the general applicability of section
301(b) without any consideration of mitigating circumstances.
Despite the seemingly irresistible logic supporting the district
court's judgment, the Supreme Court reversed in a 5 to 4 decision. The
Court found Bellei easily distinguishable from both Schneider and Af-
royim. While Afroyim's citizenship was acquired by his naturalization in
the United States and Schneider's citizenship was acquired by her par-
ents' naturalization in the United States, Bellei was neither born in the
United States nor naturalized nor subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States. This led the Court to conclude that "the first sentence of the
children, born and raised abroad . . . will have no meaningful connection with the
United States, its culture or heritage . . . . [Regardless,] Congress may not proceed by
granting citizenship, and then either qualifying the grant by creating a second class
citizenship or terminating the grant." 296 F. Supp. 1247, 1252 (D.D.C. 1969).
76. Shortly after the Schneider decision, the Court reiterated that "'freedom of
movement across frontiers in either direction . . . is basic in our scheme of values."'
Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 505-06 (1964), quoting Kent v. Dulles, 357
U.S. 116, 125-26 (1958). Aptheker would seem to furnish a constitutional rationale for
holding that the residence requirements of both sections 340 and 352(a)(1) were invalid
on their faces.
77. Despite Afroyim's absolute language, the qualifying word must be used because
of the possibility of fraud, supra note 58, and the problem of volition, supra note 55.
78. The Court's survey of all of Bellei's opportunities to comply with section
301(b), 401 U.S. 815, 818-20, and the fact that Bellei asserted "no claim of ignorance or
of mistake or even of hardship," id. at 836, raises the nagging question of volition.
Interestingly, the statute afforded him no opportunity to show ignorance or hardship or
mistake or even that his residence in this country would not have been in the national
interest despite the fact that he was deferred from military service because of his
employment in Italy with the NATO defense program.
79. Congress took great pains to proscribe these activities in section 349(a). The
absence of any consideration of Bellei's actions in Italy raises questions about section
301(b)'s purpose. It is debatable whether the due process clauses rational nexus
requirement is fulfilled.
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Fourteenth Amendment has no application to plaintiff Bellei. He simply
is not a Fourteenth Amendment first sentence citizen.""0 The Court
,argued that the existence of the citizenship clause:
[h]as not touched the acquisition of citizenship by being born abroad
of American parents; and has left that subject to be regulated, as
it had always been, by Congress, in the exercise of the power con-
ferred by the Constitution to establish a uniform rule of naturali-
zation. 8 '
Thus, Bellei's "claim to citizenship is wholly, and only, statutory. 8s2 The
Court thought that congressional power to deal with "the entanglements
which may stem from dual allegiance '8 3 was an obvious concomitant of
the power to create "statutory citizenship." The Court thought that
section 301(b)'s passage:
[r]eveals a careful consideration by the Congress of the problems
attendant upon dual nationality of a person born abroad ....
The solution to the dual nationality dilemma provided by the Con-
gress by way of required residence surely is not unreasonable. It
may not be the best that could be devised, but here, too, we can-
not say that it is irrational or arbitrary or unfair. 84
The Court could not see the logic behind recognizing congressional
power to create Bellei's citizenship on the one hand yet disparaging the
validity of imposing certain "reasonable" conditions on the retention of
that citizenship on the other.85 Rather, section 301(b) simply required a
person with dual citizenship to elect one citizenship or the other.8 6
The Court emphatically rejected the contention that Congress had
made Bellei a second class citizen by forcing him to make a choice that
other citizens did not have to make.87 The Court argued that Belle's
80. 401 U.S. at 827.
81. United States v. Wong Kim Ak, 169 U.S. 649, 688 (1898). The Court cites
this statement approvingly in Bellei, 401 U.S. at 830, despite the fact that it was certainly
dictum in Wong Kim Ark, which involved a child born in the United States not abroad.
The practice of citing dictum was heavily criticized by the dissenters in Afroyim, 387
U.S. at 275-77.
82. 401 U.S. at 833.
83. Id. at 832, quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 187 (1963)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
84. 401 U.S. at 833.
85. Id. at 834.
86. Id. at 833.
87. "Neither are we persuaded that a condition subsequent in this area impresses
one with 'second-class citizenship.' That cliche is too handy and too easy, and, like most
cliches, can be misleading. . . . The proper emphasis is on what the statute permits him
to gain from the possible starting point of noncitizenship, not on what he claims to lose
from the possible starting point of full citizenship to which he has no constitutional right
in the first place." Id. at 835-36.
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admittedly differential treatment was justified by his clearly different
circumstances: he never resided in the United States, and despite repeat-
ed warnings about the consequences of continued residence in Italy, he
expressed neither the desire nor the intention of ever living in the United
States. Since he never had a constitutional right to be an American
citizen in the first place, the Court held that Bellei's conditional citizen-
ship did not violate either the citizenship or due process clause.88
Justice Black, author of the Court's opinion in Afroyim, wrote the
principal dissenting opinion in Bellei. 9 He argued that Bellei could not
be meaningfully distinguished from either Schneider or Afroyim since:
[U]nder the view adopted by the majority today, all children born
to Americans while abroad would be excluded from the protect-
ions of the Citizenship Clause and would instead be relegated to the
permanent status of second class citizenship, subject to revocation
at the will of Congress. The Court rejected such narrow, restrictive
and super-technical interpretations of the Citizenship Clause . . .
in Afroyim .... 90
Justice Black contended that it was the act of conferring citizenship
rather than the place it was conferred or the residence of the citizen that
was dispositive of the citizenship clause's applicability.91 He took excep-
tion to the Court's "irrational or arbitrary or unfair" standard" and he
accused the majority of imposing a completely arbitrary standard in
place of the Constitution's dictates.98
Despite the Court's attempt to distinguish Belle! from Afroyim, it is
clear that Bellei liberalizes the absolute conception of citizenship that
Afroyim seemed to make a Fourteenth Amendment standard. The
Court's affirmation of section 301(b)'s validity both on its face and as
applied to Bellei means that there is a category of citizenship that,
although legally obtained, is not indestructible. Despite the questionable
88. Id. at 836.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 839.
91. "If, for example, Congress should decide to vest the authority to naturalize
aliens in American embassy officials abroad . . . I have no doubt that those so
naturalized would be just as fully protected by the Fourteenth Amendment as are those
who go through our present naturalization procedures .... [O]ne can become a citizen
of this country by. being born within it or by being naturalized into it." Id. at 843
(emphasis in original). Justice Black argues that Bellei's acquisition of citizenship was
tantamount to being naturalized. Id. at 839-40.
92. "It is a dangerous concept of constitutional law that allows the majority to
conclude that, because it cannot say the statute is 'irrational or arbitrary or unfair,' the
statute must be constitutional." Id. at 844.
93. "The Court today puts aside the Fourteenth Amendment as a standard by
which to measure congressional action with respect to citizenship, and substitutes in its
place the majority's own vague notions of 'fairness."' Id. at 844.
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relevance of Marshall's dictum in Osborn v. Bank of the United States 4
to nationality cases, Afroyim adopted that opinion's thesis of the limita-
tion of congressional power over citizenship. Bellei clearly departs from
this standard, acknowledges congressional power over some types of
citizenship, and suggests a possible re-evaluation of Afroyim's Four-
teenth Amendment absolutism.
On the surface, the Court's logic seems reasonable. Since Bellei was
neither born nor naturalized in the United States, the citizenship clause
is not precisely applicable. It is probably true that "[olne could hardly
call this a generous reading of the great purposes the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted to bring about." 95 It is not inconceivable,
however, that if the Fourteenth Amendment's framers were concerned
with congressional power over citizenship at all, they inferentially meant
to exclude from the amendment's protection those who were neither
born in nor took an oath of allegiance to the United States. Indeed, the
Court's opinion took at least implicit cognizance of Bellei's particular
circumstances rather than mechanically applying section 301(b). The
Court argued that the withdrawal of Bellei's citizenship was neither
arbitrary nor abrupt, and it took note that he was not condemned to a
condition of statelessness.9" The Bellei majority seemed implicitly to
balance the competing equities. While Bellei's denationalization could
not be equated with the achievement of a compelling governmental
interest, it seemed that on balance, the government's interest in with-
drawing the citizenship of an individual over whom it had never had
jurisdiction at least arguably outweighed Bellei's interest in or need to be
an American citizen.97
To a large extent, however, the Bellei majority begs rather than
answers the most compelling questions concerning citizenship. It is one
thing for the Court to confine its ruling to a very narrow set of
circumstances; it is very different to virtually ignore that decision's
impact on a broader legal area. While the Court's opinion purports to
address the limited facts presented, Bellei raises questions about Afroy-
im's continuing relevance. It is important to note that Bellei, not Afroy-
im, invented the concept of a "Fourteenth-Amendment first sentence
94. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 827 (1824).
95. 401 U.S. at 838-39.
96. Id.at 836.
97. In United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967), the Court seemed to reject the
use of a balancing approach when important civil liberties were endangered by a
governmental program. Rather, when substantial interests are involved, "we deem it
inappropriate for this Court to label one as being more important or more substantial
than the other." Id. at 268 n.20.
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citizen!'; Afroyim held only that American citizenship was indestructi-
ble. The loophole that the Bellei majority located in the Fourteenth
Amendment's coverage might reveal a much more fundamental shift in
judicial thinking.
In a low key fashion, the Court seemed to remove citizenship from
the "preferred" status to which Afroyim had elevated it. The logic that
Bellei had no right to retain his citizenship because Congress need not
have made him a citizen means that only those born in the United States
can be assured of retaining their citizenship. Thus, the Court's division
over the nature of American citizenship is essentially a contrast between
those judges who believe that the Constitution makes citizenship an end
in and of itself, and those judges who argue that when citizenship
becomes an impediment to the exercise of one of Congress' powers, the
necessary and proper clause9 8 implies congressional power to divest that
citizenship. Yet Afroyim clearly held that the power to divest was not a
necessary and proper adjunct of the power to conduct foreign affairs. In
holding that the citizenship clause does not preclude section 301(b)'s
divestment of Bellei's citizenship, the Court rather incredibly concludes
that if Congress can adopt conditions that must be met before citizen-
ship can be attained by a person born abroad9 then surely it can impose
the "same condition subsequent" to attaining citizenship.Y00
It is easy to concede the validity of the precedent condition, that
one parent of a child born abroad must be an American citizen who has
resided in the United States for at least ten years. It does not follow,
however, that a statute requiring the child who acquires citizenship in
this manner live in the United States for at least five years prior to age
twenty-eight is "precisely the same condition subsequent." This analogy
hardly makes the "good constitutional sense' 0' that the Court claims. It
seems inescapable that the condition subsequent is very different from
the condition precedent; section 301 (a) (7), which gave Bellei his citi-
zenship, is very different from section 301 (b), which took it away, and
98. "To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." Art. I, see.
8, cl. 18 (emphasis added). If denationalization is a necessary incident to the conduct of
foreign affairs, presumably Congress could recognize the president's primacy in foreign
affairs and delegate him the power to denationalize. Delegations recognizing this primacy
were upheld in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20
(1936).
99. 401 U.S. at 831.
100. Id. at 834.
101. Id.
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residence in the United States by the child's parent before the child is
born is surely not the same as residence in the United States by the child.
The logical extension of this position is devastating to the civil
liberties of those who acquire their citizenship under an act of Congress.
It means that statutes such as section 340, which circumscribe constitu-
tionally protected activities, are perfectly constitutional since the "good
moral character" and "attachment to the principles of the Constitution"
requirement is the same both prior and subsequent to the attainment of
citizenship. Undoubtedly, Congress could have required Bellei to live in
the United States for five years prior to age twenty-eight as a condition
for attaining American citizenship, just as aliens must reside in this
country for five years before they are eligible to become citizens. 0 2 But
Afroyim held that Congress may not impose conditions for retaining
citizenship; yet section 301(b) imposes just such a condition.
E. Conclusion
In a subtle fashion, the Burger Court reintroduced for debate two
important questions. The proposition that, since Congress was under no
constitutional obligation to grant Bellei citizenship, the citizenship thus
conferred was only a "watered-down" version of the citizenship pos-
sessed by those born in the United States, simply restates the virtually
discredited right-privilege dichotomy. The alternative is that the proper
question is not whether Bellei had a constitutional right to become an
American citizen, but whether, as a citizen, he had the same right to live
abroad that all native born citizens had. The Court never reached this
question in Bellei, apparently because it was unwilling to accept Afroy-
im's major premise: once granted, a person's citizenship is beyond any
congressional power to involuntarily divest it. 03
Bellei also suggests that the "necessary and proper" theory of
denationalization, which was a virtually unchallenged rationale for con-
gressional power until Afroyim, might be re-emerging. In Bellei, the
Court thought it beyond question that Congress could confront and deal
with problems that might arise from an individual's possession of dual
citizenship. Logically, if Congress possesses the power to remedy the
purely hypothetical problems that Bellei could have caused, it is difficult
to believe that Congress would be constitutionally unable to denational-
102. Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 242.
103. After quoting from Afroyim, the Court argued: "We do not accept the notion
that those utterances are now to be judicially extended to citizenship not based upon the
Fourteenth Amendment and to make citizenship an absolute." 401 U.S. at 835.
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ize the perpetrator of acts that might have a direct and detrimental affect
on the conduct of foreign affairs. Once the logic of a power to denation-
alize is admitted, it is nearly impossible rationally to limit the power.
Afroyim's solution was to abolish the power to denationalize completely;
the Burger Court seemed unwilling to accept this solution in Bellei. The
proper response seems to be that, although Congress may, of course,
discourage and punish private individuals who interfere with the con-
duct of foreign affairs, methods other than denationalization must be
found.
The problem of volition, which Afroyim left unresolved, has been
replaced in importance by the re-emergence of a need to enunciate a
coherent theory of American citizenship. Until the Court settles on such
a theory, the disarray that has plagued citizenship law can do nothing
but persist. More importantly, imprecision poses a significant threat to
citizenship, which is an important building block for other civil liber-
ties.104
104. If one is permitted to remain in this country, denationalization is not as
devastating as it might be since the Bill of Rights and other constitutional safeguards
apply to everyone in the United States. Similarly, in Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634
(1973) and Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), the Court held that alienage
was a suspect classification that was subject to close judicial scrutiny. This situation
happens to be a quirk of our constitutional system since "the stateless person has no
rights, either intranational or international, which are inalienable. He exists at the mercy
of the State in which he resides." Comment, The Expatriation Act of 1954,- 64 YALE LJ.
1164, 1191 (1955) (footnotes omitted). If, however, he is forced to leave this country,
and "[e]very sovereign State has the right to expel aliens from its borders, and modem
States including the United States do so freely," id. at 1190 (footnotes omitted), he may
not be so lucky. Other countries might opt to be less charitable and "if a stateless person
is a victim of a 'denial of justice' by the governmental authorities of a State, he has no
recourse whatever. Under contemporary international law neither the governments of
individual States nor international organizations are considered to have legal standing to
intervene in his behalf." Id. at 1191 (footnotes omitted). For these reasons, the
Comment's author argues that denationalization is cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 1194. Chief Justice Warren echoed this view
in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101-02 (1958), but it has never been adopted.
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